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Realising Transition Pathways 
‘Realising Transition Pathways’ (RTP) is a UK Consortium of engineers, social scientists and 
policy analysts. The consortium is managed by Professor Geoffrey Hammond of the University 
of Bath and Professor Peter Pearson of Cardiff University (Co-Leaders). It includes research 
teams from nine British university institutions: the Universities of Bath, Cardiff, East Anglia, 
Leeds, Loughborough, Strathclyde, and Surrey, as well as Imperial College London and 
University College London. The RTP Project [www.realisingtransitionpathways.org.uk] 
commenced in May 2012 and is sponsored by the ‘Engineering and Physical Sciences Research 
Council’ (EPSRC: Grant EP/K005316/1). It is a renewal and development of the earlier 
‘Transition Pathways’ (TP) project, which was initially established in 2008 with the joint 
sponsorship of E.ON UK (the electricity generator) and the EPSRC. This project addressed the 
challenge of the so-called energy ‘trilemma’: the simultaneous delivery of low carbon, secure, 
and affordable energy services for the electricity sector. It developed and applied a variety of 
tools and approaches to analyse the technical feasibility, environmental impacts, economic 
consequences, and social acceptability of three ‘transition pathways’ towards a UK low carbon 
electricity system. These pathways explore the roles of market, government and civil society 
actors in the governance of a low carbon energy transition.  
The research within the RTP Project seeks to explore further the constraints and opportunities 
in realising a low carbon UK energy sector, including those stemming from European 
developments. This project includes studies on the horizon scanning of innovative energy 
technologies over the period to 2050, the feasibility of demand responses, uncertainties in 
economic analysis, the estimation of investment costs of the different pathways, and the 
implications of markets for investment decisions about energy technologies. Further work is 
being undertaken on conceptualising, mapping and analysing ‘actor dynamics’ in the 
contemporary UK electricity sector, historical transitions and case studies, integrated energy 
networks modelling and evaluation, and ‘whole systems’ energy and environmental appraisal 
of low carbon technologies and pathways. The consortium is also developing their initial work 
on branching points on pathways, in order to identify and explore other potential branching 
points on the core transition pathways.  
Follow us on Twitter  @RealisingTP  
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Abstract 
Under the 2008 Climate Change Act, the UK has committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 
by 80% by 2050. This implies a radical transformation of systems for meeting energy service 
demands - in particular, a transition to a low carbon system of electricity generation and supply. 
Despite efforts by the UK Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to examine pathways 
to 2050, most of the focus in UK energy policy has been on the shorter term reforms needed to 
incentivise high levels of investment in low carbon generation technologies, embedded in the Energy 
Bill currently going through the UK Parliament. This chapter draws on work by the authors and 
colleagues on UK low carbon transition pathways for the electricity sector to 2050 (Hammond and 
Pearson, 2013; Foxon, 2013) to examine the drivers and consequences of alternative low carbon 
pathways, and reflect on the implications for current UK energy policy measures. This suggests that 
governance models with different roles for government, business and civil society could lead to quite 
different low carbon futures, so that which model dominates could have a significant influence on 
the direction of change and the risks and challenges to be addressed. Whilst a hybrid government-
market form of governance appears to be emerging, there still seems to be a relatively small role for 
civil society in influencing the pathway to a low carbon future. 
  
                                                          
1
 A revised version of this working paper will appear in Bumpus, AG & Okereke, C (eds.), Carbon Governance, 
Climate Change and Business Transformation, Routledge, 2014. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Mitigating the threat of climate change by reducing carbon emissions is a societal challenge 
that requires response by governments, businesses and civil society. It will also be an 
opportunity for investment and innovation in creating new industries and new jobs and for 
incumbent firms to develop or accommodate new technologies and business models.. 
However, given the fundamental role of energy provision to meeting the service needs of 
industry and consumers in a secure and affordable way, achieving a transition to a low 
carbon economy requires attention to be paid to pathways of transition, as well as the roles 
of the different actors. Broadly, governments need to put in place credible long-term 
frameworks that provide incentives for investment, businesses need to undertake that 
sometimes risky investment, and civil society needs to continue to support the case for 
change and articulate the benefits to individuals and society. However, these different 
actors tend to have different priorities that may lead to different visions of a low carbon 
future and the appropriate governance mechanisms for achieving these. This chapter draws 
on work by the authors and colleagues on UK low carbon transition pathways for the 
electricity sector to 2050 (Hammond and Pearson, 2013; Foxon, 2013) to examine the 
drivers and consequences of alternative low carbon pathways, and reflect on the 
implications for current UK energy policy measures and business responses. 
 
2. Development of UK climate and energy policy since 2008 
 
In October 2008, Prime Minister Gordon Brown set up the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC), to take over some of the functions of the Departments for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (energy) and for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(climate change). And in November 2008, the UK Parliament passed the Climate Change Act 
(2008), with agreement of all the major political parties. This was in response to the 
scientific evidence on the current and likely future impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2005; 
2011), the economic analysis provided by the Stern Review (2007) and lobbying by 
environmental NGOs. This Act places a duty on current and successive UK governments to 
act to ensure that the UK reduces its greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050, relative to a 
1990 baseline. The Act also created an institutional structure by which the government 
could be held to account for progress towards this target. An independent Committee on 
Climate Change, consisting of experts on science, technologies and economics, was set up to 
provide ongoing advice to government and specifically to recommend the level of five-
yearly carbon budgets, at least 15 years into the future. If accepted by the government, 
these carbon budgets set a cap on total UK territorial emissions for that period. The caps 
which have been accepted by the government for the first four carbon budget periods, 
2008-12, 2013-17, 2018-22 and 2023-27, correspond to a 34% reduction in UK greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2020, and a 50% reduction in emissions by 2025, relative to 1990 levels. 
The Low Carbon Transition Plan (HM Government, 2009) and the Carbon Plan (HM 
Government, 2011) were subsequently put in place by Labour and Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat Coalition governments, respectively, to provide a set of measures and incentives 
to achieve these targets. 
 
As energy for providing electricity, heat and transport services is a major source of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas emissions, much of the focus of these measures and 
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incentives was on energy supply and demand. Indeed, meeting the 2050 reduction goal 
implies a radical transformation of systems for meeting energy service demands and indeed 
of these demands themselves. Scenarios produced by the Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC, 2008) and others focused on a transition to a low carbon system of electricity 
generation and supply. This was because there are a range of technologies for low carbon 
electricity generation, including coal and gas with carbon sequestration, nuclear power and 
a range of renewables, such as wind, wave, tidal, solar, geothermal and biomass, and the 
potential for expanding the use of electricity to heating and transport, through the use of 
air- or ground-source heat pumps and electric vehicles. This still leaves open a wide range of 
potential pathways with different mixes of low carbon generation and different amounts of 
effort to improve conversion efficiencies and manage end-use demand. 
 
Given the fundamental role of energy in providing the services that people and businesses 
need, and in contributing to economic prosperity, the appropriate pathway to follow will be 
politically contentious. Even though the need to achieve significant reductions in carbon 
emissions has been accepted by UK political leaders, it is challenging, in tough economic 
times, to maintain an appropriate balance between incentivising carbon reductions and 
maintaining secure and affordable energy supply – the so-called energy ‘trilemma’ (Boston, 
2013). In addition, the governance of UK energy systems has already undergone significant 
changes in the last 25 years (Pearson and Watson, 2011). The UK moved from state-owned 
provision of electricity and gas after the Second World War, through a process of 
privatisation and market liberalisation in the late 1980s and 1990s, to achieve competitive 
markets in wholesale electricity generation and in supply of power and gas to domestic and 
business consumers. Through a series of mergers and acquisitions, the UK electricity  market 
is now dominated by 6 international, vertically-integrated energy firms.  
 
This process of liberalisation had the unanticipated consequence of reducing the UK’s 
carbon emissions since 1990, as a result of a rapid expansion of gas-fired electricity 
generation, as new efficient gas-fired generation was built to compete with and replace old 
coal-fired generation (Pearson, 2000). This resulted by 2011 in gas providing the largest 
share (41%) of electricity supply, with 29% from coal, 18% from nuclear and 9% from 
renewables. Though this helped to reduce household energy bills until around 2005, since 
then rises in wholesale gas prices have resulted in increasing household energy bills, leading 
to much greater political salience of the affordability of energy. In addition, around a 
quarter (20 GW) of existing electricity generation plant, mostly coal and nuclear, is due to 
close by 2020. This has raised concerns over security of supply, meaning that up to £110 
billion of investment in low-carbon generation, transmission and distribution will be needed 
by 2020 to keep the lights on (Ofgem, 2010). As a result, a further reform of UK electricity 
markets is being undertaken, embodied in the Energy Bill currently going through 
Parliament and expected to become law in 2013. 
 
The Energy Bill focuses on new incentives for low-carbon and secure electricity generation, 
needed to achieve the UK’s carbon emissions caps to 2020 and 2025 under the carbon 
budgets. They have been designed particularly to promote investment by private firms in 
new nuclear capacity and onshore and offshore wind generation. The latter is also driven by 
the need to expand renewable generation to around 30% by 2020, in order to meet the UK’s 
commitment under the European Union Renewables Directive. Previously, it had been 
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envisaged that the carbon price under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) would 
provide the main incentive for switching to low carbon generation. However, due to the 
reduction in industrial and commercial energy demand as a result of the economic 
downturn, as well as the political and institutional challenges of a multi-country, multi-
sectoral policy instrument, firms have found it easier than expected to achieve their caps 
under this scheme, reducing the demand for additional permits and so depressing the 
carbon price under the EU ETS to around £5/tonne CO2 by early 2013. So, the UK 
government legislated under the Finance Act 2011 for a unilateral UK carbon price floor 
applying to the UK electricity generation sector only, rising from £15.70/tCO2 in 2013 to 
£30/tCO2 in 2020, to £70/tCO2 in 2030 (real 2009 prices) (DECC, 2012). This effectively 
imposes a carbon tax to set the carbon price for this sector, on top of the wider carbon 
emissions trading scheme.  
 
The other main measures to be introduced in the Energy Bill are Contracts for Difference 
feed-in tariffs, a Capacity Market and an Emissions Performance Standard. The Contracts for 
Difference (CfD) feed-in tariffs provide a guaranteed price, known as the ‘strike price’, for 
new low-carbon generation. As the name suggests, the CfD establishes a contract between a 
generator and a counterparty owned by the Government, which provides for a top-up to the 
strike price if the wholesale electricity market price is less than this price, with the generator 
paying back for any times that the market price is higher than the strike price (see Figure 1). 
The top-up is paid for by a levy on all consumers’ energy bills. At the time of writing, the first 
CfD is currently being negotiated between the UK government and the energy firm EDF for 2 
new nuclear power stations at Hinkley Point in South-West England. Unconfirmed press 
reports suggest that a strike price of around £100/MWh is being negotiated for this first-of-
a-kind plant.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Operation of the Contract for Difference feed-in tariff (Source: DECC (2012a), reproduced 
under the terms of the Open Government Licence: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-
government-licence/.) 
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The Capacity Market will provide for auctions for additional effective capacity, including 
storage and demand-side response options, if needed to maintain security of supply (see 
also DECC, 2013). The Emissions Performance Standard provides a limit on the emissions of 
new fossil fuel power stations, initially to be set at 450 gCO2/kWh. This would prevent the 
building of new unabated coal-fired power stations (i.e. without carbon sequestration), but 
would allow building of new unabated gas-fired power stations. 
 
These electricity market reform proposals thus represent a significant increase in 
government involvement in previously liberalised energy markets. We have argued that this 
represents a move from a market-led approach to a hybrid government/ market-led 
approach (Foxon, 2013; Foxon and Bolton, 2013). The UK government envisages this as a 
necessary but temporary strategy, before moving back to a more market-oriented 
approach, in which strike prices under the CfDs would be set by a form of competitive price 
discovery through tenders or auctions (DECC, 2012). However, it remains to be seen if it will 
be possible to return to a market-led approach.  
 
As well as policy relating to energy supply and the measures to be introduced via the 
Capacity market, mentioned above, the UK government has also been somewhat belatedly 
developing a broader set of strategies to address energy efficiency and energy demand 
reduction.  For example, the Carbon Plan (HM Government, 2011) states that energy 
efficiency will have to improve across all sectors to the point where per capita energy use 
has fallen to between  a fifth and a half of its 2011 value; and in November 2012 DECC 
published the government’s Energy Efficiency Strategy (DECC, 2012b).  As part of this 
strategy, policies include the Green Deal programme, to let householders and businesses 
pay for the cost of energy-saving property improvements, over time, through savings on 
energy bills; further funding is available for some people and properties via the Energy 
Company Obligation (ECO), which provides a subsidy from energy suppliers. These policies 
offer both challenges and opportunities for incumbent and new businesses, both in energy 
supply and in the supply chains relating to domestic, commercial and industrial premises, 
appliances and controls. 
 
Despite this wide range of policy measures, their effectiveness depends on the willingness 
of energy companies, investors, businesses and households to respond by investing in low 
carbon and energy efficiency alternatives and/or changing their practices and behaviours, 
and the confidence these actors place in government not to subsequently change the 
supporting measures in ways that would disadvantage them. The willingness of the public to 
accept these and potentially more stringent policy measures, especially if they are seen as 
contributing to higher energy costs, is likely to depend on the widespread acceptance of the 
need for climate change mitigation, and the perceived credibility of the measures in 
contributing to low carbon pathways for the UK.  
 
 
3. UK low carbon transition pathways 
 
In order to investigate the implications of different governance framings on energy choices, 
the authors and colleagues are undertaking ongoing research on UK low carbon transition 
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pathways for the electricity sector (Hammond and Pearson, 2013; Foxon 2013). This work 
involved selecting, developing and analysing transition pathways to a ‘more electric’ low 
carbon future and undertaking integrated ‘whole system’ assessments of the pathways’ 
technical, economic, social and environmental implications, in order to inform thinking and 
decisions on low carbon transitions. This focussed on development and analysis of pathways 
contributing to meeting the 80% carbon reduction target by 2050, but went beyond 
previous scenario work by investigating the roles of actors and, in current work, on ‘who 
needs to do what by when’ to realise these pathways. 
 
The development of the pathways drew on interviews and workshops with energy system 
stakeholders from industry, government and non-governmental organizations, historical 
case studies of past energy system transitions (Arapostathis et al., 2013) and theoretical 
insights on understanding socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2002; Hofman and Elzen, 2010; 
Foxon et al., 2010). As the research team were interested in the role of governance framings 
or ‘logics’ in influencing the rate and direction of a low carbon transition, we developed the 
idea of an ‘action space’ for analysing the interactions between different logics2. The logic 
represents the actors’ assumptions underlying the governance of the energy system, 
including the relative roles of regulation and market frameworks, and the relative 
importance attached to the objectives of carbon reduction, energy security and affordability 
in the energy ‘trilemma’. In order to simplify and structure the analysis, we identified three 
key logics – a market logic, in which energy policy objectives are seen as best achieved by 
market actors freely interacting within a high-level policy framework; a government logic, 
which envisages a dominant role for the direct co-ordination of energy systems by national 
government actors to deliver energy policy goals; and a civil society logic, in which citizens 
are seen to take a leading role in the decisions relating to how their local and national 
energy systems operate. These three logics compete  in a dynamic fashion to form the 
dominant framing for the governance of national energy systems and so strongly influence 
the rate and direction of future pathways (Foxon, 2013). In current work, we are exploring 
the competition between these logics in more depth but in the first phase of the research, 
we focussed on development and analysis of three pathways in which each of the logics 
respectively dominates. This facilitates understanding of how these different logics may 
influence policy and individual choices and demand, supply and technology outcomes. 
 
In the Market Rules pathway, in which the market logic dominates, a high carbon price is 
necessary to drive market actors to invest in low carbon technologies, but there is limited 
interference in market arrangements, so ‘government sets the framework, and then gets 
out of the way’. Under this pathway, large energy companies continue to play a dominant 
role and see the ‘highly electric, low carbon future’ as a strategic business opportunity. This 
leads to high levels of investment in large-scale low carbon generation technologies, 
including coal and gas-fired generation with carbon sequestration, new nuclear power 
stations and large-scale renewables, such as offshore wind power. As 80% of the generation 
capacity is still connected at the high-voltage transmission level, this implies the need for 
high levels of transmission reinforcement, as well as ‘smart grids’ to meet increasing 
amounts of distributed generation. 
 
                                                          
2
 The action space concept was originally developed by Jacquie Burgess and Tom Hargreaves at the University 
of East Anglia, UK. 
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In the Central Co-ordination pathway, a government-led Strategic Energy Agency is set up to 
manage a process of central contracts for tranches of low carbon generation. This enables 
the government to direct the mix of low carbon generation technologies, leading to co-
operation but also tensions between government and large energy companies. This 
pathway also sees significant roles for nuclear power, coal and gas-fired generation with 
carbon sequestration and offshore wind, but with a greater emphasis on domestic and 
industrial energy efficiency measures. Again, 80% of the generation capacity is still 
connected at the high-voltage transmission level, implying the need for high levels of 
transmission reinforcement, as well as ‘smart grids’ to meet increasing amounts of 
distributed generation. 
 
In the Thousand Flowers pathway, civil society, including local community groups, play a 
much greater role in the energy system and, together with a large number of small-scale 
energy service companies, develop a more diverse range of local energy solutions. In this 
pathway, technological and behavioural changes lead to significant end-user demand 
reductions, and there is commercial deployment of a range of distributed generation 
technologies, including biomass cogeneration of heat and power, solar photovoltaics and 
solar thermal, and onshore wind. This results in 50% distributed generation by 2050 
requiring the development of ‘smart grids’ to handle two-way power flows. Nevertheless, 
50% of generation capacity is still connected at the high-voltage transmission level, implying 
the need for significant levels of transmission reinforcement. 
 
Through a process of technical elaboration with our engineering research colleagues and 
informed by their energy system modelling (Barton et al., 2013; Barnacle et al., 2013), we 
undertook a quantification of the above narratives for each pathway. This leads to 
projections of the changes to energy service demand and electricity generation mixes for 
the three pathways (Foxon, 2013). 
 
 
4. Comparison of low carbon transition pathways with DECC 2050 pathways 
 
As noted above, the UK government currently seems to be moving to a hybrid government-
led/market-led approach to governance of a low carbon transition in the energy system. In 
the 1990s, a market-led approach was dominant, with a programme of privatisation of 
previously state-run gas, electricity and coal companies and liberalisation of energy markets 
to promote competition in generation and supply (Pearson and Watson, 2010). Together 
with access to supplies of natural gas from the North Sea, and regulatory acquiescence, this 
resulted in an expansion of gas-fired power generation and eventually a reduction in prices 
to domestic and industrial consumers, helping to fuel economic growth. However, the need 
to meet carbon reduction targets to 2025 and to work towards the 80% reduction targets by 
2050, growing disquiet about the adequacy of infrastructure investment, and increasing 
concerns over energy security as North Sea gas supplies decrease, have led to growing 
direct government intervention in the management of the energy system. However, the 
pro-market philosophy still plays a significant role, with the UK government seeing itself as 
setting up a race between different low carbon technologies: “Rather than pick a winning 
technology, the Government will create markets that enable competing low carbon 
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technologies to win the largest market share as the pace of change accelerates in the 
2020s” (HM Government, 2011, p. 12). 
 
As such, the UK government has not produced a preferred pathway to meeting the 2050 
target. Instead, it has used modelling tools to explore different potential scenarios, including 
the MARKAL energy systems model (Strachan et al., 2011) and its own DECC 2050 pathways 
spreadsheet-based calculator tool (DECC, n.d). The MARKAL model optimises the mix of 
demand-side and supply-side measures, for example finding the least cost mix to meet the 
80% reduction target by 2050, given assumptions about technology learning rates. The DECC 
2050 pathways tool, on the other hand, allows the user to estimate the level of deployment 
of different demand-side and supply-side options, corresponding to different roll-out and 
build rates, and so specify plausible mixes of options to meet carbon reduction targets. The 
UK government’s 2011 Carbon Plan (HM Government, 2011) includes four scenarios to 2050 
– a core MARKAL scenario and three scenarios developed using the DECC 2050 calculator. 
We now briefly compare these scenarios with our low carbon transition pathways (see 
Figures 2-4). This comparison is discussed in more detail in a project working paper (Davies 
et al., 2013). 
 
In 2010, the UK had 98 GW of electricity generation capacity, including 62 GW of gas and 
coal-fired generation, 11 GW of nuclear power, 9 GW of renewable generation and 9 GW of 
heat and power cogeneration, providing an annual total of 365 TWh of supply. Under the 
core MARKAL scenario, by 2050, capacity rises to a total of 106 GW, including 33 GW of 
nuclear, 28 GW of coal and gas generation with carbon sequestration, and 45 GW of 
renewable generation, providing a total of 536 TWh of supply. This is driven by the 
expansion of the use of low carbon electricity in transport for electric vehicles and in heating 
via air- and ground-source heat pumps, as well as for domestic and industrial power and 
lighting services. The DECC ‘higher renewables; more energy efficiency’ scenario sees 
capacity rise to a total of 135 GW, including 106 GW of renewables, 16 GW of nuclear and 
13 GW of coal and gas with carbon sequestration, providing a total of 530 TWh of supply by 
2050. The DECC ‘high nuclear; less energy efficiency’ scenario sees total capacity rise to 99 
GW, including 75 GW of nuclear power, 22 GW of renewables and 2 GW of gas with carbon 
sequestration, providing a total of 610 TWh of supply by 2050. The DECC ‘higher CCS; more 
bioenergy’ scenario sees total capacity reach 96 GW, including 40 GW of coal and gas with 
carbon sequestration, 36 GW of renewables and 20 GW of nuclear power, providing a total 
of 490 TWh of supply by 2050. Thus, all of these scenarios envisage a massive expansion of 
low carbon generation to replace the current fossil fuel intensive mix, and meet additional 
demands for low carbon electricity in transport and heating, but with radically different 
generation mixes. None of these scenarios sees a significant expansion of heat and power 
cogeneration. 
 
The Market Rules pathway has a total supply of 539 TWh by 2050, very similar to the DECC 
core MARKAL scenario, though with a higher proportion met by renewables (80 GW of 
capacity) and a lower proportion met by nuclear (26 GW of capacity). This suggests similar 
projections of the levels of demand-side energy efficiency improvements, but that the 
Market Rules pathway is more optimistic about the viability of investment in renewables 
capacity and less optimistic about the viability of nuclear power under a market-led 
governance arrangement with a high carbon price as the main driver of investment. The 
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Central Co-ordination pathway assumes greater demand-side energy efficiency 
improvements, leading to a total supply of 427 TWh by 2050. This requires 65 GW of 
renewables capacity, 30 GW each of nuclear and 30 GW of coal and gas with carbon 
sequestration. Both these low carbon transition pathways assume that nuclear and coal and 
gas with carbon sequestration operate at lower capacity factors than those in the core 
MARKAL scenario, with in particular the gas capacity having a greater role as back-up for 
intermittent renewable generation. 
 
The Thousand Flowers pathway includes even greater demand-side energy efficiency 
improvements, arising through both technological changes and behavioural adaptations, 
and much higher levels of local distributed generation (up to 50% of total generation by 
2050). This results in a total supply of 313 TWh by 2050, requiring 96 GW of renewables 
capacity, but only 5 GW of nuclear and 22 GW of coal and gas with carbon sequestration. In 
particular, much higher levels of electricity demand are met by renewable (biomass) 
combined heat and power (CHP) cogeneration by 2050. This offsets much centralised 
electricity generation in two ways. Firstly, by direct replacement of centralised generation 
and, secondly, by offsetting electricity demand for heating using heat pumps. This higher 
proportion of local distributed generation has implications for the rest of the power system, 
in the need for ‘smart grids’ to manage two-way power flows, including excess of supply for 
periods, and a need for some capacity, such as gas-fired generation with carbon 
sequestration, operating at low capacity factors to provide back-up to other intermittent 
renewables supplies, mainly onshore and offshore wind (Barton et al., 2013). However, the 
total capacities of both nuclear power and coal and gas with carbon sequestration in 2050 
are much lower in this pathway due to the lower levels of demand and the use of flexible 
biomass cogeneration. 
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Figure 2. Annual UK electricity generation in 2010 and 2050 under different pathways (source: 
Davies et al. 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Annual UK electricity demand in 2050 under three DECC scenarios and three Transition 
Pathways (source: Davies et al. 2013) 
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Figure 4. Total UK generation capacity in 2050 under DECC scenarios and Transition Pathways 
(source: Davies et al. 2013) 
 
 
5. Implications for UK energy and climate policy 
 
Both the DECC 2050 scenarios and our low carbon transition pathways, together with other 
UK 2050 scenarios (Ekins et al., 2013), demonstrate the range of possibilities for a secure 
and low carbon UK energy system by 2050. However, any of these pathways would be 
extremely challenging to achieve, and would require significant action by industry, 
government and civil society actors to balance low-carbon, security and affordability 
objectives, in the face of multi-faceted risks and uncertainties, some predictable and some 
not . The pathways, though, highlight different challenges for different actors and different 
visions for the priorities and goals for UK energy policy (Foxon, 2013). The Thousand Flowers 
pathway would require energy users and households to take a more active and demanding 
role in energy service provision, in relation to energy efficiency improvements and more 
local distributed generation. This may require broader changes in social attitudes towards 
focussing on ‘quality of life’ benefits, rather than narrow economic benefits. The Market 
Rules pathway highlights the challenges for market actors in delivering high levels of 
investment in large-scale low carbon generation options, given risks and uncertainties in the 
technical and economic feasibility and social acceptability of some of these options. 
Furthermore, this requires confidence in the credibility of governments to ensure a 
sustained high carbon price or other measures to enhance the returns on these low carbon 
options. The Central Co-ordination pathway would give government actors greater direct 
influence over the future evolution of energy systems. However, this would require greater 
political leadership than policy makers have generally been willing to show - and possibly 
the exercise of more authority than some market and civil society actors might be willing to 
tolerate. 
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In general, this type of pathway analysis highlights the high-level choices that need to be 
made in realising a transition to a low carbon energy system. It also explores the social and 
political means of making those choices, and informs the ways in which the objectives, 
thinking and actions of different actors might need to become aligned (although the 2050 
Calculator does not explore the policy, institutional and societal changes that would 
underlie the DECC scenarios). The analysis suggests, for example, that business needs to 
decide to what extent and in what ways it wishes to work with national, regional and local 
government and with civil society in the form of community groups and individual 
consumers and ‘prosumers’. As for governments, some would argue that they have 
historically been poor at picking technology ‘winners’ and tend to impose high levels of 
bureaucracy, so they should just set the framework and then ‘get out of the way’ to allow 
market actors to make those choices, as in our Market Rules pathway. However, as 
mitigating climate change is largely a public benefit rather than a private benefit or source 
of revenue to individual consumers and producers, the demand for this has to be articulated 
through government action and the rules and incentives that governments put in place 
often implicitly favour one technology or another. Given that different low carbon 
technologies are at different stages of technical and commercial development, a completely 
‘technology-neutral’ policy framework is probably impossible. 
 
Others would argue for a greater role for local communities, including local authorities in 
energy provision, as in our Thousand Flowers pathway. In this approach, a variety of local 
renewable generation and energy efficiency measures could provide more secure, low 
carbon heat and power supplies, reducing transmission losses and creating local economic 
benefits, in the form of investment and jobs. However, given the levels of local opposition 
seen to some forms of renewable generation, such as wind power, and the need for more 
behavioural changes to reduce energy demands and take a more direct role in energy 
provision, this will require further developments in planning and public engagement and 
greater social change than is currently generally envisaged. While the government has 
already begun to recognise the need to ensure that local communities affected by new 
energy installations receive appropriate benefits, it remains to be seen how successfully 
they and businesses will manage to strike a balance between local and national interests 
and yet maintain the momentum implied by the 2050 targets.  
 
Yet others would argue for government to take a greater role in explicitly making trade-offs 
between low-carbon, security and affordability objectives and in consequent technology 
choices, as in our Central Co-ordination pathway. However, as noted, this requires high 
levels of political leadership and greater democratic accountability in relation to making 
these choices.  
 
As we have seen, the UK government is currently moving to a hybrid market/government-
led governance approach for the UK energy system, with relatively little role for civil society. 
Despite the setting into law of stringent carbon reduction targets to 2050 and intermediate 
carbon budgets under the Climate Change Act, and a plethora of Energy White Papers and 
Carbon Plans, there has still been relatively little public debate about the desired vision of 
the future energy system. So far, debate has centred on the desirability or otherwise of 
particular technology choices, such as onshore wind and new nuclear power, with little 
context as to how these might contribute to low carbon and secure energy supplies. 
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Moreover, the issue of affordability of energy services for households (Hills, 2012) and 
businesses is rapidly rising up the political agenda, following increases in retail gas and 
electricity prices, due to rising international gas prices and financial support for renewables. 
The prospect of increasing levels of financial incentives for renewables and new nuclear 
power under the Contract for Difference feed-in tariffs, which will be passed through to 
consumers’ bills, is likely to raise the salience of the affordability issue further. 
 
The recent conduct of energy and climate policy and the discussions around it reflect, 
however, an implicit and sometimes explicit reweighting by the current government of the 
relative priorities of the low carbon, energy security and affordability/ international 
competitiveness objectives that were established in the 2003 Energy White paper and 
reflected in the Climate Act 2008. In light of the financial crisis, rising energy prices, recent 
developments in the US of shale and other forms of unconventional gas and effective 
lobbying by climate science sceptics, this is perhaps not surprising. This reweighting, with 
greater emphasis on energy security and affordability/ competitiveness relative to climate 
change and low-carbon objectives has been signalled by ministerial changes at DECC and 
reports of the growing influence of the Treasury in areas from the carbon budgets to the 
funding of the government’s Green Investment Bank. And even though the Electricity 
Market Reform to be enacted via the Energy Bill is designed to provide a level of certainty to 
businesses and investors about the direction of travel towards a low carbon electricity 
system and the levels of support into the future, uncertainties remain about the trajectory 
and durability of the explicit and implicit market value of carbon in the UK and more widely.    
 
This and the foregoing pathway and scenario analyses suggest the need for a higher level of 
public debate on what type of energy system people want by 2050, how the objectives of 
low-carbon, security and affordability should be balanced and how and by whom they 
should be financed and delivered. The type of pathway and scenario analysis described in 
this chapter could play a role in informing this debate, which we argue is crucial for ensuring 
that people’s private demands for secure and affordable energy service provision are met 
whilst achieving the socially-desirable goal of contributing to mitigating climate change and 
ensuring that business can play its part in delivering these outcomes.. 
 
 
6. Opportunities and Risks for Business 
 
We think that there are significant opportunities for business in the low carbon area. There 
are a range of renewable supply and control technologies with potential for both 
widespread domestic deployment and generating major export markets. The growing scale 
of production and growth of experience in wind and photovoltaic technologies has the 
potential to drive several technologies down their experience curves, with lower costs and 
greater market penetration, though, as ever, it is not easy to foresee exactly which will be 
the ‘winning’ technologies. Smart grids and smart controls, at both national and local levels, 
including smart metering, will be needed both to manage the growing share of intermittent 
renewables but also the growth and load profiles of demand. There are also likely to be 
growing physical and financial opportunities relating to developments in interconnectors 
and the possibilities for a European ‘supergrid’. As the UK (and other countries) pursue the 
decarbonisation of the electricity sector, renewable heat and vehicular transport will 
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provide further opportunities relating not only to the technologies themselves but also the 
supply chains in both the built environment and transport. In most low carbon pathways, 
energy efficiency and demand management measures will have significant roles to play, 
especially to meet the needs of households and businesses challenged by rising energy bills. 
This is likely also to require the development of new business models, including energy 
service companies (Hannon et al., 2013) and engagement with potential new generations of 
‘prosumers’. Finally, consumers have a growing appetite for new electronic devices 
interfacing with ICT that will satisfy their demands for information, entertainment and 
personal management of time, assets and costs in affordable ways. 
 
There are also, however, significant risks for businesses. Concerns about the value and 
durability of carbon and government commitments to it, as reflected in future national and 
international carbon prices, instruments and legislation, could deter low carbon 
investments. On the other hand, some have suggested that investors in businesses that hold 
high-carbon inventories of fossil fuels may face increasing risks if indeed governments, other 
businesses and civil society increasingly commit to carbon reduction (Leaton et al. 2013);  
for example, it has been suggested that reserves of coal, oil and gas held by companies 
listed in London could be ‘sub-prime’ assets that pose a systemic risk to investors and 
pension funds and hence economic stability ). Similarly, business with a high stake in older 
low-carbon technologies and/or with business models that prove unsuited to a lower 
carbon world may find themselves facing substantial sunk costs. For example, will the 
traditional large electricity and gas utilities, energy suppliers and their technologies remain 
fit for purpose in a world where consumers want lower energy bills, the ‘right’ kinds of 
smart appliances, from companies they trust, and where others may wish to pursue more 
local and small-scale solutions to the challenges of energy demand and supply? Insights 
from previous industrial transformations suggest that a successful transition to a low carbon 
economy would require significant interactions between changes in practices, technologies 
and business strategies (Foxon, 2011; Fouquet and Pearson, 2012; Pearson and Foxon, 
2012). 
 
However, if the projections of the likely severity of human-induced climate change are as 
serious as the overwhelming majority of climate scientists agree, and governments can 
continue to command public support for the type of measures that the UK government is 
implementing, then businesses that seize the opportunities that a low carbon economy 
offers will be the ones that prosper commercially whilst contributing to a sustainable future.    
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7.  Conclusions 
 
Recent analyses, including those of the Transition Pathways project have shown the 
complexities of resolving the shifting priorities of the energy policy trilemma in a privatised 
and liberalised electricity system. While there are many technological routes to deliver low 
carbon pathways, our research shows that governance and the roles of key actors in 
government, the market and civil society will be of central importance in determining 
whether and how we ‘get there from here’.  Our pathways illustrate the opportunities for 
these key actors, not least those in business, to play significant parts in helping to resolve 
the tensions inherent in developing and delivering an energy system that is low carbon, 
secure and affordable. They also suggest that in all pathways the market sector will have a 
significant role to play.  This will require the ability to adapt and respond to dynamically 
changing market and governance conditions and to develop new, robust business models 
that are fit for purpose, enabling agile businesses to prosper in a carbon-constrained but 
sustainable world. 
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